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The growth of  industry during the last quarter of the nineteenth century in- 
spired one of the most influential efforts to promote the coordination of eco- 
nomic  activity:  the  industrial engineering  movement  of  the early twentieth 
century. Although railroads had devised elaborate methods of internal commu- 
nications and record  keeping by midcentury, the late-nineteenth-century fac- 
tory  remained  a loosely  organized  cluster  of  operations.  Coordination  de- 
pended  on  the  leadership  of  plant  executives  and  personal  relationships 
between supervisors. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of factory management 
was the conspicuous role of the first-line supervisor; foremen organized mate- 
rials and labor, directed machine operations, recorded costs, hired and fired 
employees, and presided over a largely autonomous empire. In the 1870s and 
1880s, however, critics began to attack the “chaotic” condition of contempo- 
rary industry and to propose a more systematic, centralized approach to pro- 
duction management. Their critique became the basis for the best-known effort 
to encourage coordination within the firm during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Under  various  labels-systematic  management,  scientific  manage- 
ment,  efficiency  engineering,  and, by  the  1920s, industrial engineering-it 
fostered greater sensitivity to the manager’s role in production and greater di- 
versity in industrial practice, as managers selectively implemented ideas and 
techniques. 
2.1  Systematic and Scientific Management 
The attack  on traditional management  originated  in two  late-nineteenth- 
century developments (see Nelson  1992a, 6-9).  The first was the maturation 
of  the engineering profession, whose advocates sought an identity based on 
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formal education  and mutually  accepted  standards of behavior and who re- 
jected empiricism for scientific experimentation and analysis. The second de- 
velopment, closely related, was the rise of systematic management, an effort 
among engineers and sympathizers to substitute system for the informal meth- 
ods that had evolved with the factory system. Systematic management  was a 
rebellion against tradition, empiricism, and the assumption that common sense, 
personal  relationships,  and craft knowledge  were sufficient to run a factory. 
The revisionists’ answer was to replace traditional managers with engineers 
and to substitute managerial systems for guesswork and ad hoc evaluations. 
By the late 1880s, cost accounting systems, methods for planning and sched- 
uling  production  and  organizing  materials,  and incentive  wage plans were 
staples of a burgeoning  literature of  industrial management.  Their objective 
was an unimpeded flow of materials and information. In human terms, system- 
atic management sought to transfer power from the first-line supervisor to the 
plant manager and to force all employees to pay greater attention to the manag- 
er’s goals. Most threatening to the status quo, it promoted decisions based on 
performance  rather  than  on personal  qualities  and  associations  (see Yates 
1989, 1991; Levenstein 1991). 
In the 1890s, an ambitious young inventor, manager, and consultant, Freder- 
ick Winslow Taylor, became  the most vigorous and successful proponent  of 
systematic management.  As a consultant, he introduced  accounting  systems 
that  permitted  managers  to  use  operating records  to guide  their  actions, 
production-control  systems  that  allowed  managers  to know  more  precisely 
what  was  happening on the shop floor, piece-rate  systems  that  encouraged 
workers to follow  orders  and instructions,  and various related  measures.  In 
1895, he employed a colleague, Sanford E. Thompson, to help him determine 
the optimum time to perform  industrial tasks; their goal was to compute, by 
rigorous study of the worker’s movements and the timing of those movements 
with stopwatches,  standards for skilled occupations  that  could be published 
and sold to employers. Between  1898 and 1901, as a consultant to the Bethle- 
hem Iron Company, Taylor introduced all of his systems and vigorously pur- 
sued his  research on the operations of  metal-cutting  tools. This experience, 
punctuated by controversy and escalating conflict with the company’s manag- 
ers, was the capstone of his creative career. Two features of it were of special 
importance. Taylor’s discovery of high-speed steel, which improved the perfor- 
mance of metal-cutting tools, assured his fame as an inventor. In the meantime, 
his effort to introduce  systematic  methods  in  many  areas of  the company’s 
operations forced him to take an additional step: to develop an integrated view 
of managerial innovation and a broader conception of  the manager’s role. By 
1901, Taylor had fashioned scientific management  from systematic manage- 
ment (Copley 1923; Nelson  1980; Kakar 1970). 
As the events of Taylor’s career make clear, the two approaches were inti- 
mately related. Systematic and scientific management had common roots, at- 
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retrospect the differences stand out. Systematic management was diffuse and 
utilitarian, a series of isolated measures that did not add up to a larger whole 
or have recognizable implications  beyond day-to-day industrial  operations. 
Scientific management added significant detail and a larger view. It was the 
first step toward the utopian vision of the 1910s. In 1901, when he left Bethle- 
hem, Taylor resolved to devote his time and ample fortune to promoting his 
new conception of industrial management. His first report on his work, Shop 
Management  (  1903), portrayed  an  integrated  complex  of  systematic  man- 
agement methods,  supplemented by  refinements and additions such as time 
study. 
In the following years, as Taylor’s reputation grew, he modified his presenta- 
tion to make it more appealing. Two changes were notable. First, he began to 
rely more heavily on anecdotes from his career to emphasize the links between 
improved management, greater productivity, and social melioration to audi- 
ences that had little interest in  technical  detail. He liberally interpreted  his 
records and recollections to make his point. His parable of “Schmidt,” a laborer 
who supposedly prospered because of  an incentive wage, was largely apocry- 
phal, but it captured the imaginations of legions of readers (Wrege and Perroni 
1974). Second, apart from the object lessons, Taylor spoke less about factory 
operations and more about the significance and general applicability of his 
ideas. Between  1907 and  1909, with the aid of  a close associate, Morris L. 
Cooke, he wrote a sequel to Shop Management that became The Principles of 
Scientijic Management (1911) (Wrege and Stotka 1978). Rather than discuss 
the specific methods he introduced in factories and shops, Taylor relied on 
colorful  stories and language to illuminate “principles” of  management. To 
suggest the integrated character and broad applicability of scientific manage- 
ment, he equated it to a “complete mental revolution.” 
Taylor’s reformulation  of  scientific management  was the single most im- 
portant step in the popularization of industrial engineering. The Principles ex- 
tended the potential of  scientific management to nonbusiness endeavors and 
made Taylor a central figure in the “efficiency craze” of  the  1910s (Haber 
1964). To engineers and nonengineers alike, he created order from the diverse 
prescriptions of a generation of technical writers. By the mid-l910s, he had 
achieved wide recognition in American engineering circles and had attracted 
a devoted following in France, Germany, Russia, and Japan (Fridenson 1987; 
Moutet  1975; Homburg  1978; Beissinger  1988; Daito  1989; Gordon  1989). 
His growing body of admirers at universities such as Pennsylvania State Col- 
lege, which introduced the first industrial engineering major in 1907, was an- 
other measure of the potency of his message (Nelson 1992b). 
Taylor also had a major influence on the diffusion of scientific management 
in industry. His insistence that the proper introduction of management methods 
required the services of an expert intermediary linked the progress of industrial 
engineering to the activities of independent consultants and accelerated the 
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2.2  The Role of the Consultant 
Initially,  the  spread  of  systematic  and  scientific  management  occurred 
largely through the work of independent consultants, a few of whom, such as 
the accountant J. Newton Gunn, achieved prominence by the end of the nine- 
teenth century. By 1900, Taylor overshadowed the others; by 1910, he had de- 
vised a promotional strategy that relied on a close-knit corps of consultants to 
install his techniques, train the client’s employees, and instill a new outlook and 
spirit of cooperation. The expert was to ensure that the spirit and mechanism of 
scientific management went hand in hand. The formula did not always work 
smoothly, as many accounts have emphasized (Nelson  1980, 137-67;  Aitken 
1960; Nadworny 1955). Nevertheless, it produced a number of successful con- 
sulting firms and the largest single cluster of professional consultants devoted 
to industrial management. 
Between 1901 and 19  15, Taylor’s immediate associates introduced scientific 
management in nearly two hundred American businesses, 80 percent of which 
were factories (Thompson  1917, 36-104).  Some of the plants were large and 
modern, like the Pullman and Remington Typewriter works; others were small 
and technologically primitive. Approximately one-third of the total were large- 
volume producers  for mass  markets.  A majority  fell into one of  two broad 
categories. First were those whose activities required the movement of large 
quantities of materials between numerous workstations (textile mills, railroad 
repair shops, automobile plants). Their managers sought to reduce delays and 
bottlenecks and increase throughput. On the other hand were innovative firms, 
mostly small, that were already committed to managerial reform. Their execu- 
tives were attracted to Taylor’s promise of social harmony and improved work- 
ing conditions. A significant minority of the total fell in both categories. Many 
of the textile mills, for example, were leaders in welfare work (Nelson  1984, 
The records that have survived suggest that the consultants provided valu- 
able services to many managers. They typically devoted most of their time to 
machine operations, tools and materials, production schedules, routing plans, 
and cost and other record systems. Apart from installing features of systematic 
management,  their  most  notable  activity  was  to  introduce  elaborate 
production-control mechanisms (bulletin boards and graphs, for example) that 
permitted managers to monitor operations. At the Franklin Automobile Com- 
pany and a number of textile mills, the consultant’s work consisted almost ex- 
clusively of improvements in scheduling and routing (Babcock  1917; Nelson 
1980, 149-54).  Critics complained of excessive detail and red tape, but most 
executives expressed satisfaction with the engineers’ work. 
The records do not support the contention, common to many later accounts, 
that the experts’ central concern was the work of the individual employee. In 
one-third of the factories, the consultant’s activities generated such controversy 
that time and motion  studies were never undertaken.  Many workers in other 
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plants were unaffected. At least one-half of the employees of  the industrial 
companies must have been essentially onlookers. They may have experienced 
fewer delays, used different tools, or found that their supervisor’s authority had 
diminished, but their own activities were unchanged (Nelson 1992b, 11-12). 
What about those who were directly affected? Judging from the available 
evidence, neither Taylor nor his critics provided  an accurate guide to the ex- 
perts’ activities. Supervisors lost much of their discretionary authority as they 
became subject to centrally imposed policies and regulations. Machine opera- 
tors worked more steadily and performed  fewer peripheral tasks. They also 
earned higher wages, though there were enough exceptions to blur the effect. 
Some unskilled jobs disappeared as improved scheduling and routing reduced 
the need for gangs of laborers and encouraged the introduction of materials- 
handling machinery. But few firms embraced functional foremanship, which 
called for substituting specialists for the traditional supervisor, and even fewer 
tried to substitute management systems for the expertise of skilled operatives. 
While no systematic accounting is possible, improvements in production and 
costs resulted overwhelmingly from the elimination of delays and bottlenecks, 
improved communications, and the introduction or extension of  wage incen- 
tives, not from new techniques of work or work organization. 
Initially, at least, social harmony was more often a casualty than a conse- 
quence  of  scientific  management.  Supervisors  opposed  the erosion of  their 
powers and autonomy, while production workers often resisted the introduction 
of time study. The proper use of time study became and remained a delicate 
issue. The consultants’ promises of harmony and prosperity depended on the 
fair and “scientific” application of time study, but many workers suspected that 
it would be a pretext for rate cuts and lower wages. In many cases their fears 
were warranted. Labor disputes (and strikes at Watertown Arsenal, Joseph & 
Feiss, and American Locomotive) resulted from the inability of many manag- 
ers to resist the temptation to use time study for short-term cost cutting. Such 
abuses led to vigorous union campaigns against time study and incentive plans 
in the mid-1910s. 
The contrast between the theory and practice of industrial engineering re- 
flected  several factors. The most obvious was the tradition  of decentralized 
production management and the established web of interests that resisted inno- 
vation. A second factor was closely related: in most settings prior investment 
in machinery and other equipment limited the engineer’s ability to introduce 
changes, regardless of the liberality of his or her mandate. An ideal arrange- 
ment would have required a new plant as well as new attitudes and responsibili- 
ties. A third element, ironically, was the role of the consultant, which contrib- 
uted to a short-term, cost-cutting perspective. By definition a consultant was a 
transient, short-term employee. Taylor had proclaimed that a thorough reorga- 
nization required three or four years, but few of his successors had the temerity 
or financial security to make similar demands on their clients. They promised 
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reliance on the consultant had been a way  to accelerate the diffusion  of  his 
ideas. In practice, however, it undermined the likelihood of a “complete men- 
tal revolution.” 
Between  1910 and  1920, industrial engineering  spread rapidly. Although 
large firms introduced staff departments devoted to production planning, time 
study, and other industrial-engineering  activities, the most  notable deveiop- 
ment of  those years was the proliferation of consulting  firms. By  1915, the 
year of Taylor’s death, he and his immediate followers no longer controlled the 
diffusion of his methods. Professional organizations, notably the Taylor Soci- 
ety (1910) and the Society of Industrial Engineers (191 l),  provided forums for 
the discussion of techniques and the development  of personal contacts. But 
after brief and unsuccessful trials, they did not try to regulate entry to the pro- 
fession or certify the competence of practitioners (Nelson 1980, 181-85;  Haber 
1964). Financial success and professional recognition increasingly depended 
on entrepreneurial and communications skills rather than technical expertise. 
Several of Taylor’s closest associates, including Carl G. Barth and H. K. Hatha- 
way, failed as consultants, while a new generation  of practitioners,  including 
many  university  professors  who had  had  no direct contact  with  Taylor and 
whose credentials would have been  viewed  with  suspicion  a decade earlier, 
developed successful consulting practices. 
Competition for clients and recognition-especially  after the recession  of 
1920-2 1  made  executives  more  cost-conscious-produced  other  changes. 
Some consultants began to seek clients outside manufacturing. Spurred by the 
growing corps of academicians who argued that the principles of factory man- 
agement applied to all businesses, they reorganized offices, stores, banks, and 
other service organizations (Davies 1982,97-108;  Strom 1989, 64-69;  Rotella 
1981, 51-58;  Yates 1989, 21-64).  Others specialized. A Society of Industrial 
Engineers survey of leading consulting firms in 1925 reported that many con- 
fined their work to plant design, accounting systems, machinery, or marketing 
(Quigel 1992,403). A third trend was an increasing preoccupation with labor 
issues and time study. This emphasis reflected several postwar developments, 
most  notably  and  ominously  the  increasing  popularity  of  consultants  who 
devoted  their  attention  to cost cutting  through  the  aggressive  use  of  time 
study. 
By the early 1920s, industrial engineers who worked in industry had divided 
into two separate and increasingly antagonistic camps. On the one hand were 
the pioneers and their heirs who viewed  scientific management as an inter- 
related group of techniques that included increasingly sophisticated policies 
for managing production workers. Taylor and his associates had devoted little 
attention  to  labor  issues  apart  from wage  incentives.  The attacks  of  labor 
unions and their political allies exposed the limitations of this approach, and 
the World War I economic boom showed that other personnel activities such 
as recruitment and training programs, representation  schemes, and employee 
benefit plans were as important to improved economic performance  as time 
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of  industrial engineers,  centered in  the Taylor Society, embraced  personnel 
management and combined it with orthodox industrial engineering to form a 
revised  and updated  version  of scientific management. A handful of Taylor 
Society activists, Richard Feiss of Joseph & Feiss, Henry S. Dennison of Den- 
nison Manufacturing, Morris E. Leeds of Leeds & Northrup, and a few others, 
mostly owner-managers, implemented the new synthesis. They introduced per- 
sonnel management and more controversial  measures such as profit sharing, 
company unionism, and unemployment insurance that attacked customary dis- 
tinctions  between  white-  and blue-collar  employees and enlisted  the  latter, 
however  modestly,  in  the  management  of  the firm  (Goldberg  1992; Heath 
1929; Berkowitz and McQuaid 1992; Nelson  1970). 
A larger group emphasized the potential of  incentive plans based on time 
and motion study and disregarded or deemphasized other features of orthodox 
scientific management. Their more limited approach reflected the competition 
for clients, the trend toward specialization, and the continuing attraction of rate 
cutting. Indicative of this tendency was the work of two of the most successful 
consultants of  the post- 19  15 years, Harrington Emerson and Charles E. Be- 
daux. Emerson (1853-193 1) was a restless, creative, and flamboyant personal- 
ity. Attracted to Taylor at the turn of the century, he briefly worked as an ortho- 
dox practitioner and played an influential role in Taylor’s promotional work. 
He soon became a respected accounting theorist and a successful reorganizer 
of railroad  repair  facilities. As his reputation grew, however, he broke with 
Taylor and  set up a competing business with a large staff of engineers and 
consultants. Between 1907 and 1925, he had over two hundred clients (Nelson 
1980, 127-30;  Johnson and Kaplan 1987,51; Quigel 1992,279-325).  He also 
published best-selling  books and promoted  a mail-order  personal efficiency 
course. He was probably the best-known industrial engineer of the late 1910s 
and early 1920s.’ 
Emerson’s entrepreneurial instincts defined his career. An able technician, 
he was capable of  overseeing the changes associated with orthodox scientific 
management. He also recruited competent assistants, such as Frederick Park- 
hurst and C. E. Knoeppel, who later had distinguished consulting careers, and 
E. K. Wunnerlund, who became the head of industrial engineering at General 
Motors. But Emerson always viewed his work as a business and.tailored his 
services to this customer’s interests. In practice, this meant that his employees 
spent most of their time conducting time studies and installing incentive wage 
systems. By the mid- 1920s, General Motors, Westinghouse, the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad,  Aluminum  Company  of  America,  American  Radiator,  and 
many other large and medium-sized industrial firms had introduced the Emer- 
son system and in many cases an industrial engineering department staffed by 
former Emerson employees.’ 
1. “Hamngton Emerson, 1853-193 I,”  Harrington Emerson Papers, box 9, Pennsylvania State 
2. Emerson Papers, boxes 2-9. 
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Bedaux  (1886-1944)  was even more adaptable. A French immigrant who 
was a clerk at a St. Louis chemical company in 1910 when an expert arrived 
to conduct time studies, Bedaux quickly grasped the essentials of time study 
and replaced the outsider. During the “efficiency craze” that followed the pub- 
lication of The Principles, he found other clients. The turning point in his ca- 
reer came in 1912, when he accompanied several Emerson engineers to France 
as an interpreter. In Paris he struck out on his own, reorganized several factor- 
ies, and studied the writings of Taylor and Emerson. Returning to the United 
States during World War I, he launched the Bedaux Company and began to 
cultivate clients. Bedaux rejected the promotional strategy that Taylor, Emer- 
son, and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, other Taylor disciples, had perfected. He 
gave no speeches, wrote no books or articles, avoided professional meetings, 
and never discussed his methods in public. Instead he relied on personal con- 
tacts and a simple, compelling promise: he would save more money than he 
charged. Although Bedaux employed able engineers and usually made some 
effort to reorganize the plant, his specialty was the incentive wage. His men 
worked quickly, used time studies to identify bottlenecks and set production 
standards, installed a wage system similar to Emerson’s, and explained their 
activities in incomprehensible jargon. Bedaux’s clients included General Elec- 
tric, B. F.  Goodrich, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Dow Chemical, Eastman Ko- 
dak, and more than two hundred other American firms by the mid- 1930s. His 
European offices were even more successful (Kreis 1992). 
Bedaux’s secretive approach makes it impossible to generalize about his ser- 
vices in the United States, but the records of  his British subsidiary, recently 
opened,  reveal  a  consistent  effort  to  pressure  workers  for greater  output. 
Whereas Taylor and his followers opposed wage cutting and “speed-up” ef- 
forts, Emerson was more flexible, and Bedaux made a career of forcing work- 
ers to do more for less. One notable result was a resurgence of  strikes and 
union protests. By the  193Os, Bedaux had become infamous on both sides of 
the Atlantic. In response to his notoriety, he revised his incentive plan to in- 
crease the worker’s share and dropped much of  his colorful terminology, in- 
cluding the famous B unit. Bedaux’s business survived, though neither he nor 
his firm regained the position  they had enjoyed  in the late  1920s and early 
1930s (Kreis 1992). 
Bedaux’s unsavory reputation was a substantial burden for other industrial 
engineers. The growth of labor unrest in the 1930s and the frequent appearance 
of the “Be-do” plan on grievance lists revived the association of industrial en- 
gineering with labor turmoil. Regardless of their association with Bedaux and 
his tactics, industrial engineers became the targets of union leaders and their 
allies. In industries such as autos and tires, worker protests paralyzed the oper- 
ations of industrial engineering departments and led to the curtailment or aban- 
donment of many activities. 
These problems were closely related to  a longer-term threat  to industrial 
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relations  in  the  mid-1930s  led  many  large  industrial  firms  to  create  or 
strengthen  personnel  departments (Jacoby  1986). In theory,  industrial  engi- 
neers and personnel  and industrial  relations experts subscribed  to the same 
values and objectives. In practice,  however, they were often antagonists and 
competitors. Apart from influencing wage, salary, and employee-benefit poli- 
cies, industrial-relations  managers  had a strong intellectual  and professional 
interest in maintaining stability on the shop floor. They helped curb the work 
of Bedaux and others like him, but they also resisted other changes that might 
lead to unrest.? Managerial innovation became more difficult, and industrial 
engineers found themselves increasingly confined to activities that did not di- 
rectly affect wages or working conditions (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). 
2.3  The Impact of Industrial Engineering in the 1920s and 1930s 
Although the archives of the major consulting firms and the publications of 
professional associations document the evolution of  industrial engineering as 
an intellectual discipline  and a professional  specialty, they provide only the 
most general indications of the effects of this activity on the firm and its em- 
ployees. The client lists that have survived generally do not explain what was 
done, who was affected, or, in most cases, how influential the work was on 
operations or the viewpoint of executives. The thrust of Bedaux’s work and of 
the expansion of industrial-relations management is clear, but its practical ef- 
fects are less obvious. What, if anything, can be concluded from the experi- 
ences of later years? 
There are at least three partial measures of the diffusion of industrial engi- 
neering that help answer this question. First, the many references to cost ac- 
counting, centralized production planning and scheduling, systematic mainte- 
nance procedures, time study, and employment management in the trade press 
and in the records of industrial corporations indicate that these activities were 
no longer novel or unfamiliar to executives. The promotional work of the con- 
sultants, the “efficiency craze,” and the growth of management education in 
universities had made the rudiments of industrial engineering widely available; 
only the oldest or most isolated executives were unaware of them. The critical 
issue was no longer the desirability of the new management; it was the particu- 
lar combination of techniques suitable for a given firm or plant, the role of the 
outside consultant, if any, and the authority of the staff experts. 
Second, the information on industrial wage systems that the National Indus- 
trial Conference Board assiduously  collected  in the  1920s and 1930s docu- 
ments widespread  acceptance  of  incentive  wage  plans,  particularly  among 
large corporations. In 1928, for example, 6 percent of the smallest companies 
(1-50  employees) had incentive wage plans, while 56 percent  of the largest 
3. Unions had a similar impact, although their influence was comparatively short-lived. See 
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firms (more than 3,500 employees) had such plans. In earlier years, small firms 
devoted to industrial reform  had been among the most vigorous proponents 
of  industrial engineering. But their ranks did not grow, and they were soon 
overshadowed by large corporations, which found in industrial engineering an 
effective answer to the problems that often prevented large, expensive factories 
from achieving their potential (Nelson  1991, 79). Incentive wage plans were 
an indicator of this trend. but-Bedaux  notwithstanding-they  were also indi- 
cators of more extensive managerial initiatives. 
The popularity of incentive plans did not mean, however, that industrial en- 
gineering had a more uniform or predictable effect on work organization and 
job content than in earlier years. Feiss, Dennison, and others hoped to trans- 
form the character of industrial work through the use of incentives and person- 
nel programs; judging from the information that survives, big business manag- 
ers had more modest goals. Their principal objective was to make the best use 
of existing technology and organization by enlisting the workers’ interest in a 
higher wage. In the early 1930s, many managers were attracted to the “work 
simplification”  movement  that grew out of  the Gilbreths’ activities, but  the 
effects were apparently negligible, at least until the World War I1 mobilization 
effort. To  most manufacturers, industrial engineering provided useful answers 
to a range  of  shop-floor problems;  it was a valuable resource but neither a 
stimulus to radical change nor a step toward a larger goal. 
A third source, contemporary surveys of the industrial engineering work of 
large corporations, provides additional support for this conclusion. The most 
interesting of these surveys, by Stanley Mathewson in  1928, found no differ- 
ence in attitude between workers at General Motors, Westinghouse, and other 
giants noted for their advanced managerial practices, and workers in smaller, 
less modem plants. Mathewson discovered widespread efforts to restrict pro- 
duction in order to protect wages or jobs (Mathewson 193  1). Clearly, the men- 
tal revolution had not reached the shop floor at these plants. A 1928 survey by 
the Special Conference Committee,  an elite group of  large industrial firms, 
emphasized related  problem^.^ It reported wide differences in the practice of 
time study, in the duties of time-study technicians, and in the degree of com- 
mitment to time study as an instrument for refining and improving the worker’s 
activities.  At  Western  Electric,  which had  one of  the  largest  industrial en- 
gineering  staffs,  a manufacturing  planning  department  was responsible  for 
machinery  and  methods; the time-study expert was simply a rate setter. At 
Westinghouse,  which  also had  a  large  industrial  engineering  department, 
time-study  technicians were responsible for methods  and rates. However, a 
report from the company’s Mansfield, Ohio, plant indicated that the time-study 
engineer could propose  changes in manufacturing  methods  “in cooperation 
with the foremen.” Most companies had similar policies. The time-study expert 
4. E. S. Cowdrick, “Methods of  Wage Payment,” Bethlehem Steel Company Papers, accession 
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was expected to suggest beneficial changes to his superiors, often after con- 
sulting the foreman, but had no independent authority to introduce them. Es- 
sentially, the “expert” was a rate setter. In most plants, industrial engineering 
focused  on detail,  seldom threatened  the  supervisors  or workers,  and even 
more rarely produced radical  changes in methods.  Except in the hands of a 
Bedaux, it was not a serious threat to the status quo. 
A recent, detailed examination of industrial engineering at E. I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Company, a Special Conference Committee member, suggests the 
range of possibilities that could exist in a single firm  (Rumm 1992, 175-204). 
Du Pont executives created an Efficiency Division in 191  1 after the company’s 
general manager read The Principles. Rather than employ an outside consul- 
tant, they appointed two veteran managers to run the division. These men con- 
ducted time and motion studies, “determined standard times and methods for 
tasks, set standard speeds for machinery, and made suggestions for rearranging 
the flow of work, improving tools, and installing labor-saving equipment.” Yet 
they encountered a variety of difficulties; their proposals were only advisory, 
they clashed  with  the new  employment department  when  they proposed  to 
study fatigue and the matching of workers and jobs, and they found that many 
executives were indifferent to their work. Worst of all, they could not show that 
their activities led to large savings. In 1914,  after the introduction of functional 
supervision in the dynamite-mixing department apparently caused several seri- 
ous accidents, the company disbanded the Efficiency Division (Stabile 1987). 
Although some Du Pont plants introduced time-study departments  in the 
following years, the company did nothing until  1928, when it created a small 
Industrial  Engineering  Division  within  the  larger Engineering  Department. 
The IED was to undertake a “continuous struggle to reduce operating costs.” 
That battle was comparatively unimportant until the Depression underlined the 
importance of cost savings. In the 1930s, the IED grew rapidly, from twenty- 
eight engineers in 1930 to over two hundred in 1940. It examined “every aspect 
of production,” conducted job analyses, and introduced incentive wage plans. 
Like Taylor’s associates a quarter century before, IED engineers began with 
surveys of existing operations. They then “consolidated processes, rearranged 
the layout of work areas, installed materials-handling equipment, and trimmed 
work crews.” To create “standard times” for particular jobs, they used conven- 
tional stopwatch time study as well as the elaborate photographic techniques 
the Gilbreths  had developed.  By  1938, they  had  introduced incentive wage 
plans  in thirty  plants;  one-quarter  of  all Du  Pont employees were affected 
(Rumm 1992, 181-87). 
Du Pont introduced a variety of incentive plans. Three plants employed the 
Bedaux Company to install its incentive system. Other managers turned to less 
expensive  consultants,  and  others,  the  majority,  developed  their  own  “in- 
house” versions of these plans. Some executives, and workers, became enthusi- 
astic supporters of incentive wages; others were more criticai. Despite the work 
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advantage of the incentive plans to increase their wages beyond the anticipated 
ranges.  Wage  inflation  ultimately  led  the  company  to curtail  the  incentive 
plans. Time and motion study, however, remained hallmarks of Du Pont indus- 
trial engineering (Rezler 1963). 
The Du Pont experience illustrates several larger themes. The diversity of 
manufacturing  operations  in  large  corporations  such  as  Du  Pont  militated 
against a “complete mental  revolution”  and  a more aggressive  approach to 
shop-floor problems than had been characteristic of the engineers’ activities in 
earlier years. Like other novel proposals, industrial engineering at Du Pont had 
to compete for resources. The failure of  the Efficiency  Division  to produce 
immediate benefits compromised its position and ultimately led to its downfall, 
despite its appealing message. Only the collapse of the economy, the rise of 
new cost pressures, and, concomitantly, the company’s success in avoiding or 
deflecting labor unrest revived interest in industrial engineering and created 
the consensus that sustained the IED in the 1930s. By 1940, IED technicians 
approached the goals of  the original scientific management movement. Still, 
Du Pont did not entirely escape the pattern of opportunistic cost cutting. The 
executives who employed Bedaux or who introduced Bedaux-like wage plans 
with minimal prior study and reorganization were examples of the other, more 
controversial side of industrial engineering. 
The eventual success of the IED obscured a more central problem. By 19 10, 
Du Pont was supposedly one of the best-managed American corporations. It 
had reorganized successfully and had absorbed much of the spirit of the scien- 
tific management movement. Yet Du Pont’s top executives had little interest in 
extending managerial reform to the shop floor. During the depression of  the 
1930s, when they developed a new sensitivity to the value of industrial engi- 
neering, they defined it as a way  to cut factory costs. They transcended the 
Bedaux approach but remained surprisingly parochial. One reason for this per- 
spective was bureaucratic: Du Pont had developed an extensive personnel op- 
eration in the 1910s and  1920s, which had authority over employee training, 
welfare programs, and labor negotiations. Equally important was the apparent 
assumption that industrial engineering only pertained to the details of manu- 
facturing activities, especially the work of machine operators. Despite mount- 
ing pressures  to reduce costs, the company’s offices, laboratories, and large 
white-collar labor force remained off-limits to the IED. Despite these handi- 
caps, the IED had a significant impact because rapid technological change in 
the industry created numerous opportunities for organizational change and Du 
Pont avoided relations with powerful unions. 
Apart from its timing, the Du Pont experience was consistent with the evi- 
dence noted  above. Like most  manufacturers,  Du  Pont executives  were re- 
ceptive to the “principles” of industrial engineering but focused on the particu- 
lars, which they assessed in terms of their potential for improving short-term 
economic performance. As a result there was little consistency in their activi- 
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pany’s  manufacturing  operations.  This approach,  fragmentary  and  idiosyn- 
cratic by the standards of Taylor or Dennison, was logical and appropriate to 
executives whose primary objective was to fine-tune a largely  successful or- 
ganization. 
2.4  Conclusions 
During the first third of the twentieth century, industrial engineers success- 
fully argued that internal management was as important to the health of  the 
enterprise as technology, marketing, and other traditional concerns. Their mes- 
sage had its greatest impact in the  1910s and  1920s, when their “principles” 
won wide acceptance and time study and other techniques became common- 
place. Managers whose operations depended on carefully planned and coordi- 
nated activities and reformers attracted to the prospect of social harmony were 
particularly receptive. By the 1930s, the engineers’ central premise, that inter- 
nal coordination required self-conscious effort and formal managerial systems, 
had become the acknowledged basis of industrial management. 
Although the popularity of industrial engineering was due in large measure 
to the writings of Taylor and other pioneers, few executives took those state- 
ments literally or introduced all or most of the changes that Taylor and other 
industrial engineers advocated. Their customary approach was pragmatic and 
selective. This selectivity was apparent in their relations with consultants and 
in the work of corporate industrial engineering departments. It was also evident 
in the treatment of factory employees, the feature of industrial engineering that 
received  the greatest attention. Time-study techniques differed from firm to 
firm, with diverse  effects, and incentive wage  plans were equally  varied  in 
conception and application. In view of these tendencies, it is hardly surprising 
that industrial engineering had no consistent or predictable effect on the char- 
acter of industrial work. 
Industrial engineering thus contributed to the growing diversity of industrial 
management  in the early twentieth century. Using techniques  developed by 
proponents of  systematic management, by Taylor and his followers, and by 
their successors of the 1920s and 1930s, industrialists were able to adjust their 
organizations to market pressures, technological innovations, and their concep- 
tions of how a factory or business ought to perform. If they were unsure how 
to proceed, armies of eager consultants, of varying degrees of  fidelity to the 
tenets of orthodox scientific management, were available to assist them. In the 
nineteenth century, few industrialists had recognized the potential of this form 
of internal coordination. By the 1930s, they took it for granted. Although the 
expansion of industrial relations activities in the late  1930s threatened to re- 
verse this pattern  and impose a new uniformity, it affected only a small per- 
centage of plants and industrial workers before World War 11. 
The variability in the practice of industrial engineering, evident from Tay- 
lor’s day to the  1940s, greatly complicates any effort to assess its economic 48  Daniel Nelson 
impact. In a minority of cases, it led to the realization of Taylor's original objec- 
tives and long periods of growth and prosperity. In other instances, it precipi- 
tated unrest, disruption, and organizational turmoil. In the majority  of cases, 
however, it contributed in numerous ways, large and small, to improvements in 
manufacturing operations and firm  performance. This mixed legacy, apparent 
by the eve of World War 11,  became the foundation for a second, more complex, 
and even more controversial chapter in the history  of  industrial engineering 
that extends to the present. 
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Comment  Michael J. Piore 
Daniel Nelson’s paper reviews the impact of  Frederick Taylor, scientific man- 
agement, and industrial engineering upon American manufacturing in the early 
part of the twentieth century. It is difficult not to read it in the context of the 
current debate about the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Many analysts 
(including myself) have attributed the problems of U.S. manufacturing in the 
1970s and 1980s to the persistence of a set of managerial principles and prac- 
tices developed earlier in the century and built into standard operating proce- 
dures of most large American corporations. As a result, it is argued, American 
manufacturing lacks the flexibility required to adjust to the rapidly changing 
business  environment. Its practices  and procedures  are also too rigid  to use 
new information and communication  technologies effectively. This view has 
spawned a number of institutional reforms designed to make American busi- 
ness more supple. 
On the shop floor, these reforms include pay for knowledge, as opposed to 
payment linked to output or to particular job assignments; the broadening, even 
the wholesale elimination, of job categories; the elimination of in-process in- 
ventories which isolate individual production operations from one another; in- 
creased use of production teams in place of individual work assignments. Re- 
form  is not  of  course limited  to shop-floor  practice.  Indeed, the  changes 
elsewhere in the organization  are, if anything, more revolutionary: efforts to 
reduce  hierarchy  and eliminate intermediate  management positions,  matrix 
management which blurs the clear lines of authority of the traditional organiza- 
tional charts, efforts to draw suppliers and customers into the design process, 
parallel engineering through cross-functional teams. We do not have a single 
name for all of the practices under attack taken as a group. Many organiza- 
tional structures that are now being eliminated are those whose origin and de- 
velopment were heralded  by  Alfred Chandler in his  monumental  work  The 
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Visible Hand; the reform movement might be called anti-Chandlerian were it 
not somewhat anachronistic to use his name to describe a set of practices that 
are on the verge of  elimination even as he arrived to celebrate them. But the 
shop-floor practices are generally linked to Frederick Taylor and the industrial 
engineering profession, and are often referred to as Taylorism. 
Read in this context, the paper constitutes an attack on the use of this term. 
Its central argument is that industrial engineering, as it was incorporated into 
American managerial practice in the 1920s, was little more than the view that 
good management involved “self-conscious effort and formal managerial sys- 
tems”; it was a “systematic, centralized approach to production management,” 
an attack on “the ‘chaotic’ condition of contemporary industry,” on “guess- 
work and ad hoc calculations.” 
The practitioners of industrial engineering (Taylor, his disciples, and other 
management consultants who delivered similar messages but with whom Tay- 
lor generally competed) championed a variety of specific techniques, including 
job evaluation and time study, but, Nelson insists, U.S. managers were “prag- 
matic and selective” in the way they absorbed these lessons. “Techniques dif- 
fered from firm to firm. . . .  industrial engineering had no consistent or predict- 
able effect on the character of industrial work.” If there was uniformity in the 
patterns that replaced the “chaotic” conditions that prevailed in the 1880s and 
1890s, it affected only a small percentage of plants and industrial workers prior 
to World War 11.  There is a strong suggestion at the end of the paper that the 
uniformity implied by the term “Taylorism” emerged later, in the 1940s. We 
will have to wait for Nelson’s subsequent work to find out how this happened. 
One imagines that it was imposed  by  government regulators  and industrial 
unions. 
A good deal of what we know about industrial engineering comes from Nel- 
son’s own work, and one would be hard-pressed to dispute his scholarship. At 
one level, I am sure that he is correct: there was much more diversity among 
industrial engineers and the particular managerial practices that were instituted 
at their behest than most recent accounts of the development of modem man- 
agement admit and more diversity still in the way in which the industrial engi- 
neering movement was felt in individual firms. In this sense, we have probably 
been rather sloppy in the way in which we have used the term. But “industrial 
engineering” and “Taylorism” may  nonetheless be an appropriate shorthand 
for the old managerial approaches in contrast to the new. 
The evolution of recent managerial practice suggests that what the industrial 
engineers viewed as “objective” and “scientific” was in fact a particular way 
of looking at production operations. The contrast between the older views and 
the current prescriptions for managerial practice is suggested by  two recent 
titles promoting what their authors clearly conceive of as a revolution: Thriving 
on Chaos and When Giants Learn to Dance. Space does not permit a detailed 
examination of the differences between the new practices and the old. Indeed, 
we may be too close to the revolution to fully assess its character. Some part 52  Daniel Nelson 
of what is going on may be a fashion that will not survive the moment. But 
the underlying principle seems to be related  to the distinction between  two 
fundamental dimensions of organization form, specialization and integration. 
Taylor, and the industrial engineering profession more broadly, emphasized the 
dimension of  specialization, the division  of  the production process into neat 
and well-defined pieces with clearly new tasks that could be unambiguously 
assigned to particular workers or work groups. In this, they applied on the shop 
floor principles that  analysts such as Weber, and  later Schumpeter, thought 
of as modem  and bureaucratic,  and Chandler  views  as the hallmark of the 
organizational revolution heralded by  the advent of  the modem cooperation. 
The newer managerial practices, inspired by Japan, stress the integration of the 
different elements of  the production process with each other. Matrix manage- 
ment, for example, and cross-functional teams break down and blur the lines 
of authority around which Chandler’s exemplary corporate organization was 
built. The parallel reforms on the shop floor are typified by the effort to elimi- 
nate in-process inventories. Production is then brought to a halt by the failure 
of  any single operation, and each operator is thereby forced to pay attention 
not only to his or her own immediate tasks but to all related tasks as well. This 
reform  requires  changes  in  accounting  procedures  that  were  once thought 
of  as modem, since these  typically  focus on  individual components  rather 
than the process as a whole; more important in the present context, it is incom- 
patible with the payment  systems pioneered by  industrial engineering, which 
for all their diversity nonetheless shared a predisposition to reward workers for 
the performance of individual tasks in ways that failed to take account of the 
system as a whole. 
It turns out, then, that what practitioners of industrial engineering viewed as 
“systematic” and “scientific” is in fact a way of looking at the world that em- 
phasizes specialization at the expense of integration. Alternative practices that 
emphasize integration appear in this perspective to be, as the titles of the texts 
that  promote  them  suggest,  “chaotic.”  One is thus  led  to  ask  whether  the 
“chaos”  of  the perspective that Taylorism began to replace at the end of  the 
last century was not actually different, but an equally coherent way of looking 
at the  world, whether Nelson’s  perspective  is not as limited by  this  way  of 
looking at the world as that of the American managerial community. 
This does not completely vitiate Nelson’s conclusions about the limited im- 
pact of industrial engineering before the war. It does suggest that his view of 
what industrial engineering was all about is both too broad and too limited. It 
is too limited because it reduces industrial engineering to the specific shop- 
floor practices that its practitioners recommended; on these specific practices, 
the  industrial  engineers  differed  among themselves  and  with  the  managers 
whom they advised and who were evidently quite selective in what they actu- 
ally introduced. But it is too broad in the sense that it accepts the engineers’ 
claim that their role was to impose an objective systemization and order upon 
a set of  practices that, before them, was objectively  chaotic. Industrial engi- 53  Industrial Engineering and the Industrial Enterprise, 1890-1 940 
neering was much more than a set of specific practices: it was a general way 
of viewing the productive process. But it was also a limited perspective, one 
that spread at the expense of  alternatives that were, in other times and places, 
at least valid. 
Nelson is probably right in his assertion that the specific practices that we 
associate with industrial engineering gained dominance in the  1940s. But it 
may be that the critical moment for the ascendancy of the perspective out of 
which these practices emerged was the two decades before that. Indeed, read- 
ing Nelson against the background of Chandler and the new managerial litera- 
ture, one might well argue that the relatively late arrival of  Taylorism on the 
shop floor simply reflected the fact that the broader perspective upon manage- 
ment that it embodied  rose to dominance in the shop last, only after other, 
higher-priority managerial practices had been changed to reflect it. Given the 
central place that industrial engineering gave to shop-floor practice, this would 
also be consistent with Nelson’s argument in the narrow sense; but again it is 
not consistent with the broader thrust of the paper. This Page Intentionally Left Blank